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While the newly envisioned Smart(er) Grid (SG) will result in a more efficient and
reliable power grid, its collection and use of fine-grained meter data has widely raised
concerns on consumer privacy. While a number of approaches are available for preserving
consumer privacy, these approaches are mostly not very practical to be used due to two
reasons: First, since the data is hidden, this reduces the ability of the utility company to
use the data for distribution state estimation. Secondly and more importantly, the
approaches were not tested under realistic wireless infrastructures that are currently in
use. In this thesis, a meter data obfuscation approach to preserve consumer privacy is
proposed to implement that has the ability to perform distribution state estimation.
Then, its performance on LTE and a large-scale Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
network built upon the new IEEE 802.11s wireless mesh standard are assessed.
LTE/EPC(Evolved Packet Core) model is used between the gateway and the utility.
EPC’s goal is to improve network performance by the separation of control and data
planes and through a flattened IP architecture, which reduces the hierarchy between
mobile data elements. Using obfuscation values provided via this approach, the meter
readings are obfuscated to protect consumer privacy from eavesdroppers and the utility
companies while preserving the utility companies’ ability to use the data for state
estimation.The impact of this approach on data throughput, delay and packet delivery
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ratio under a variety of conditions are assessed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The future SG is envisioned as a viable solution for finding efficient and economic
methods of addressing a combination of several challenges: 1) using electricity more
efficiently; 2) reducing the impact of energy production on the environment; 3)
integrating renewable energy generated by individuals; and 4) building the framework
necessary for the use of electrical vehicles [1]. One part of the SG initiative that is
currently being implemented is the AMI, which provides two-way communication
between the utility company and consumers’ “smart” meters (SMs). The utility
companies can use this infrastructure to monitor power demands over short periods,
provide more accurate billing as well as utilize dynamic pricing to facilitate the reduction
of peak demand. Typically, two-way AMI communication is ensured via a wireless mesh
network which can be based on either IEEE 802.15.4 or IEEE 802.11s standards [1][2].
Despite its potential, the implementation of the AMI has arisen concern of consumer
privacy, since the fine-grained meter data being collected could be used to infer activities
and behavior patterns of consumers [3]. The frequency of the data depends on the
application and the premise and can be from 6 secs (for businesses) to 15 mins (for
residential) as opposed to once a month in the existing grid [1]. This fine-grained data
can reveal the types of activities going on in the house. Obviously, this is against their
privacy and can have social impacts. For example, a curious person can run simple signal
capturing devices to know what his/her neighbors are doing. A jealous person may be
interested in knowing if his spouse invites friends to home when he/she has night shifts
or travels. Similarly, at the commercial level, some companies may need to spy on their
competitors. For example, smart grid traffic analysis can reveal how long a factory
works, the number of workers present in the factor, etc. Revealing this information can
cause financial losses, e.g., if a company knows that its competitors are producing too
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many products, it can work on reducing the price of this product by offering sales on
their products. Thus, any effective method of collecting and using fine-grained
consumption information from SMs must provide sufficient protection of consumer
privacy while preserving the suitability of the data for legitimate uses.
Recently, there has been much research for addressing this privacy issue under
different assumptions [4]. While some of the approaches focus solely on the
confidentiality of the meter data during its transit, others additionally strive to hide it
from utility companies by leaving the data handling to trusted third parties (TTP). In
this way, privacy can be provided by only giving the utility company the chance to do
monthly billing and thus no access to individual readings; however, the utility companies
then cannot perform distribution state estimation of the power grid, which is crucial to
them for the reliability of the grid.
To also accommodate the ability to perform state estimation at the distribution
level, data obfuscation techniques can be exploited [5]. The idea of data obfuscation is to
hide the actual energy usage by randomizing the fine-grained meter data. By perturbing
the collected reading values in a linear space, the utility company can still monitor the
distribution network and calculate billing for given intervals. Nonetheless, the
obfuscation operation necessitates the distribution of obfuscation values to each of the
SMs in a secure and efficient way. Such distribution of values within the AMI network is
crucial in order to ensure the plausibility of the privacy in addition to providing classical
security services such as authentication and integrity. Another major missing component
in the existing privacy approaches is the feasibility and scalability of the implementation
in a realistic network by considering different parameters regarding the network
architecture. This thesis addresses these two issues in a comprehensive manner.
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is a significant evolution of 4G network and the latest
standard including its origin in the GSM / GPRS legacy networks family that is
presently being deployed worldwide. LTE has high capacity with increased peak data
2
rate of 1 Gbps for the downlink and 500 Mbps for the uplink, higher spectral efficiency,
increased number of simultaneously active subscribers, and improved performance at cell
edges [6]. It has been thought [7] that the annual LTE-based communication nodes
shipment will exceed 5 million units by 2020. According to a report of The Global
Mobile Supplier Association (GSA), LTE has been the quickest developing mobile
technology ever [8]. It is believed that LTE answers the market’s demand. LTE provides
high speed, high capacity wireless communication with good Quality of Service (QoS) as
well as low latency. These properties make LTE useful for critical applications in SG as
well as for Neighborhood Area Networks, Wide Area Networks, and etc. LTE [9] has
attracted substantial interest in a Smart Grid environment since there are some reasons:
(1) low cost due to the economies of scale associated with a global standard, (2) wide
area wireless support across a power transmission and distribution network, (3) efficient
use of radio resources because of packet switching, (4) support for applications with
different Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements and built-in security functions.
Specifically, by assuming an 802.11s-based wireless mesh network and LTE for the
AMI, secure obfuscation value distribution approaches are proposed in order to
implement data obfuscation in an efficient manner based on a number of security goals
identified. Then this distribution approach and simulate obfuscated data traffic are
implemented on ns-3 [10] by using a draft version of the 802.11s and LTE
implementation. Our goal is also to assess the overhead it brings to the network and
compare the overhead to that of a regular 802.11s network and LTE which do not
provide privacy preservation. The simulation results revealed that such use of obfuscation
does not bring any overhead in terms of packet losses or packet delay compared to other
approaches. With the ability to perform state estimation, providing consumer privacy
and LTE EPC model, the approach is feasible to be used in 802.11s-based AMI networks
and LTE.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In the next section, a summary of the
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literature review is provided. In Section 3, some background on AMI network, state
estimation in power grids, LTE EPC model and describe the assumptions, security goals
and problem are provided. In Section 4, the approach for obfuscation value distribution
and obfuscated reading collection in a secure manner by a wireless mesh network and
LTE are presented. In Section 5, the approach is presented for obfuscation value
distribution in a secure manner. Section 6 is dedicated to security analysis and
experiment results. Finally, this thesis is concluded in Section 7.
4
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter summarizes an overview of communication in the Smart Grid and a
summary of approaches to providing security and privacy to Smart Grid environment.
2.1 PRIVACY PRESENTATION IN SMART GRID AMI
In general, the utility companies need fine-grained meter data for each customer to
monitor demand and the state of the distribution network as well as utilizing dynamic
pricing to reduce peak demand. Also, the utility companies would prefer to have the data
to generate the bill on-site rather than relying on each individual SM. Thus, the SG
should allow the utility companies to collect and use this fine-grained data while
protecting it from being used to monitor or profile an individual consumer’s behavior.
Various approaches of providing consumer privacy are surveyed in [4]. This work
categorizes these approaches into three groups: approaches that anonymize the
fine-grained meter data, approaches that mask or obfuscate the individual consumption,
and approaches that focus only on protecting communication of meter data from threats
in the communication network. In practice, the third category does not provide any
additional mechanism for ensuring privacy other than relying on the trustworthiness of
the utility companies.
Two approaches can satisfy the aforementioned requirements: anonymizing the data
by using an escrow service [11] and masking usage patterns by using an internal power
supply to shape the actual consumption data [12]. Masking usage patterns with an
internal power supply enables the utility company to collect the actual data without
posing a privacy risk. It can also help reduce peak demand by having the power supply
provide power during peak time and recharge when demand is low. However, the cost of
implementation and maintenance of these systems make it less than ideal to both the
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utility company and the consumer.
The approach using an escrow service creates two identities for each customer: one
for the SM to use for communication related to billing purposes and another for the
collection of fine-grained meter data [11]. While this approach is simple, it has its own
problems. First, it requires additional hardware and labor for maintaining two separate
IDs to communicate with utility and escrow service independently. More importantly, the
approach requires the escrow service to be trustworthy about the actual identities. This
could then be circumvented by capturing both types of data and inferring the
relationship between an individual SM’s two identities. Since the utility company
possesses the actual fine-grained meter data, it would then be able to determine the
behavior of individual customers.
Our privacy approach in this thesis is based on data obfuscation or hiding. One of
these obfuscation approaches in [5] explains the necessary theoretical background on the
ability of protecting consumer privacy while also allowing the utility company to perform
state estimation, billing and dynamic pricing. However, the adaptation of these ideas in
AMI infrastructure and protocols have not been studied. Our work in this thesis makes
contributions on these aspects: First, we adapt an IEEE 802.11s-based mesh wireless
network and LTE for the implementation of data collection mechanisms. Second, we
present two secure protocols for generating and distributing the obfuscation values from
the utilities to the SMs in such a large-scale network. Finally, we assess the overhead of
obfuscation value distribution protocol in this mesh network and LTE. The main
advantage of this approach is the low computation overhead compared to cryptographic
mechanisms since only addition and subtraction operations are required to create
obfuscated readings.
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2.2 STATE ESTIMATION
SG should monitor the states of the grid to be able to take the most suitable action
for the network, generations, and consumers [13]. Therefore, state estimation is
indispensable for SG functionality. In power transmission networks, state estimation at
the transmission level has been studied since 1970s [14]. At the the distribution level,
there has been several studies in recent years. For instance, Dzafic et al. [15] presented a
new approach for a three-phase distribution state estimation (DSSE). The approach
makes use of real time measurements such as current magnitude, real and reactive power
measurements. The weighted least squares error method is used for estimation of the
state variables. In another recent study for distribution state estimation, [16] investigate
the use of SMs’ power injection measurements for low-voltage system observability and
controllability. Failure resistance tests demonstrated that the state estimation accuracy
can be kept at a good level unless approximately 40% of all the SMs in the network are
lost. In addition to this study, [17] develop a state estimator for low-voltage networks
with and without distributed generations.
Following the ability of SMs to contribute to the state estimation computations, in
this thesis, we also target DSSE where SM meter readings are used. However, since the
use of SMs would introduce privacy concerns, we focus on the problem of privacy
preserving state estimation which has not been studied before in power grid state
estimation research.
2.3 LTE IN A SMART GRID ENVIRONMENT
LTE is a promising alternative for a smart grid [18, 19]. A few LTE scheduler
designs are presented for common user equipments as mobile phones. In [20, 21] and [22],
these scheduler designs have quite separate requirements in comparison with the services
asked by smart grid components. Many commercial service providers has partnered with
utilities to provide communications for Smart Grid applications. They have supported
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many technological improvements such as the general movement toward integrated
platforms and open standards for utility communication functions that are facilitated
opportunities for improved communication systems [23]. There are a few amount of
research that is conducted into the performance of an LTE system in a Smart Grid
environment. Most of the traffic with AMI is anticipated to be in the uplink direction.
Therefore, LTE Time Division Duplex (TDD) was searched in [24] as a possible solution
for AMR/AMI using LTE TDD configurations 0, 1, or 6, that are uplink based. It was
compared with LTE Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) in [25]. FDD leads to better
uplink performance with respect latency even though TDD can support greater flexibility
when the division between uplink and downlink data is unsymmetrical. The main reason
is due to the delays caused by the interchange of the uplink and downlink slots in LTE
TDD.
A smart grid based 20 MHz LTE Time Division Duplex (TDD) system is
implemented and uplink error rate curves are done; however, there is no treatment of
latency or channel utilization [26]. The performance of a 5 MHz LTE TDD system that
uses uplink and downlink allocation configuration one of them in serving a Smart Grid
Distribution Automation (DA) application [27]. It is shown that the best case and
average latency are not addressed, and is not channel utilization although the maximum
uplink latency is 66 ms (allowing for up to 3 packet re-transmission).
LTE specifies a new all-IP, packet based core network called Evolved Packet Core
(EPC). One of the crucial elements of the EPC is that control and data planes have
separate interfaces and network entities [28]. This LTE/EPC architecture is performed to
provide seamless and ideal IP connectivity between user equipment (UE) and external
Packet Data Networks (PDNs). LTE/EPC also provides on-demand connectivity service.
This service includes moving active sessions transparently and temporarily from one
network equipment to another without causing user session interruption. This service is
critical in situations such as network equipment, overload situations, and during energy
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saving measures. In this thesis, we focus LTE/EPC model between SG gateway and
utility. LTE/EPC model is explained in detail in Section 3.4.
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CHAPTER 3
PRELIMINARIES
3.1 UNDERLYING AMI NETWORK
We assume that the AMI communication network consists of SMs that are
connected via a wireless mesh network with a gateway serving as a relay between the
SMs. SM measures mainly the real-time electrical energy consumption of the customers
in addition to power quality and instantaneous values such as voltage and current at
their connection points. In the current AMI systems, this data is either collected by the
utility company control center or by a trusted third party (TTP). In this thesis, we
assume the existence of a TTP as well since handling every type of processing in a
central control center is not a scalable option [5]. In addition, a TTP can use cloud
computing infrastructure which is not only more cost effective but also provide the
opportunity to share meter data among utility companies to estimate the state in wide
area grids. A typical infrastructure for the considered AMI in this thesis is shown in
Figure 3.1.
AMI Network
Smart 
Meter
4G/LTE
Smart 
Meter
Gateway
Smart 
Meter
802.11s 
link Utility 
Control 
Center
WAN
TTP
4G/LTE
Figure 3.1. A sample AMI communication network, gateway and
long-distance communication to a utility company
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The mesh network in this figure is created using the new IEEE 802.11s standard
which allows mesh networking among the SMs through 802.11 MAC/PHY layer standard
[29]. The nodes in 802.11s WMN are given names based on their roles. All nodes are
considered as Mesh Points (MP) and are able to provide connectivity at the data link
layer between other MPs. If an MP also provides connectivity to the Internet, it is
termed a Mesh Portal Point (MPP). In our mesh network, the gateway is the MPP
which collects meter readings that are obfuscated at the MPs (i.e., SMs) via multi-hop
routes. IEEE 802.11s standard provides a routing protocol called Hybrid Wireless
Routing Protocol (HWMP) as its default routing protocol to find a multi-hop path
towards the destination.
TTP collects data from the gateway and stores this data for future access but also
forwards collected data in form of a data vector (e.g., an array) to the utility. In
addition, TTP is responsible for monthly billing computations. The utility is responsible
for creating and transmitting obfuscation base information for privacy preservation
purposes to the gateway which in turn creates the individual obfuscation values and
distributes to the SMs. The gateway communicates with the TTP and utility via LTE.
However, the utility and TTP may have other means for communication.
For security and privacy, we assume the availability of public key schemes since
symmetric key systems require a lot of overhead in terms of key management. Each SM
is initialized with a public/private key based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This
was chosen since its overhead is the minimal in comparison to other public cryptography
schemes. ECC also uses a key size comparable to current symmetric cryptographic
schemes, avoiding the higher computation of other public key schemes due to the larger
key size.The gateway knows the public key of every SM in its mesh network. Every SM
knows the public key of the gateway.
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3.2 WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES STATE ESTIMATION
A power system consists of a collection of buses, transmission lines and power
meters. State estimation is used to monitor the state of a power system (i.e., voltage
magnitude and phase angle of every bus) in order to maintain reliable power supply.
Recently, there is some interest to do state estimation in low-voltage distribution
networks using meters and their instantaneous measurements (real power, reactive power
and voltage magnitude) in addition to the measurements collected from the distribution
system substation [30]. One of the techniques for this state estimation process is called
common weighted least squares (WLS) state estimation.
In this technique, the state of the network is estimated as a vector of variables
x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T using z = (z1, . . . , zm)
T consisting of measurements from the power
meters, where n,m are positive integers such that m > n and x ∈ Rn and z ∈ Rm. Then,
the state of the system is represented by:
z = h(x) + e (3.1)
where h : Rn → Rm represents nonlinear dynamics such as the configuration of
transformers and buses in the grid and e ∈ Rm is measurement errors and unmodeled
dynamics. The state x is estimated to be xˆ by the following unbiased linear estimation:
xˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWz (3.2)
where W−1 is the covariance matrix of e.
3.3 PRIVACY-PRESERVING STATE ESTIMATION
Due to data collection from SMs, privacy came to picture in state estimation in
distribution networks. One possible solution to this issue is to perturb the collected SM
data. To this end, the authors in [5] create a distortion free obfuscation space from the
span of a basis set O = {o1, . . . , om−n} of kernel denoted as ker((HTWH)−1HTW ). Each
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oi ∈ O is a vector with m elements that will perturb the SM values. Note that there are
m− n such vectors that can be used for perturbation. The authors also create an
obfuscated measurement vector named zobf , where zobf = z + o, o ∈ O. They show that
zobf can be used in place of z to calculate the same estimated state xˆ. In this way,
without having access to actual power readings, the state of the power grid can be
estimated.
O is derived from the state of distribution of the grid such as the configuration of
the transformers stepping up or down voltages or buses branching off to multiple
distribution lines. It can be sent by the utility company only when any one of these
dynamics changes. It can be reused for multiple readings until new ones are provided.
In order to create an obfuscation vector o, some random η weight values need to be
generated. At measurement time tj, the goal is to choose a random weight η
j
i ∈ R for a
vector oi ∈ span(O) = {ηj1o1 + ηj2o2 + ηj3o3 + . . .+ ηjm−nom−n}. The values of the weights
ηji at each data collection time tj in a billing period T are chosen so that the sum of the
values of ηji in T equals to 0 (i.e.,
∑
j∈T η
j
i = 0).
After the above computation is done, an element from the vector o is sent to the
corresponding SM. Each SM adds this element to its actual power measurement in order
to conceal it and to preserve the privacy by this way.
3.4 LTE/EPC MODEL
EPC is required for end-to-end IP service delivery across LTE and is defined as a
generic IP access network. It provides IP Packet transmission only. EPC has a essential
specialty that circuit-switched based voice service and packet-switched based data service
of earlier 2G and 3G networks are combined under one single IP mobile domain [31]. In
addition, data plane and control plane have interface and network entity distinctly which
allows operators to optimize their signaling and traffic capacity separately.
The main goal of the EPC model [32] is to implement for the simulation of
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end-to-end IP connectivity over the LTE model. This model supports for the
interconnection of multiple User equipments (UEs) to the Internet, via a radio access
network of multiple Evolved Node Bs (eNBs) connected to a single Serving Gateway
(SGW) / Packet Data Network Gateway (PGW) node.
Figure 3.2. Overview of the LTE-EPC Model
As illustrated in Figure 3.2., LTE/EPC consists of the following main network
subcomponents:
• Mobility Management Entity (MME): The MME is the main control plane network
element and the key control-node for the LTE access-network. It operates user
mobility and session management signaling including such as establishment, release
and coordination of bearer signaling. It is responsible for tracking, paging,
authorization and authentication for UEs. Moreover, it is liable to select S-GW for
UEs in initial network attachment and re-location scenarios.
• Serving Gateway (S-GW): S-GW relays user data to and from eNodeB and packet
data network. It divides among resources as for each the need of other entities such
as MME and P-GW. S-GW is responsible for handovers with neighboring
eNodeB’s, and also in terms of all packets across user plane for data transfer.
14
• Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway (P-GW): The PDN Gateway specifies
connectivity from the UE to external packet data networks by being the point of
exit and entry of traffic for the UE. It is liable for allocating IP address to the UE.
• User Equipment (UE): UE is any device used directly by an end-user to connect
each other. It can be a mobile telephone, a laptop computer with a mobile
broadband adapter, or any other device. It connects to the base station Node
B/eNodeB.
• Evolved Node B (eNB): It is the hardware which is connected to the mobile phone
network. It communicates directly with User Equipments (UEs). Its functionality
likes a base transceiver station (BTS) in GSM networks.
LTE S1 interface connects eNodeB to EPC network. S1-C (Control Plane) is
designed to assign signaling messages between eNodeB and MME. During this time, S1-U
(User Plane) interface transports user data to S-GW. S5/S8 interface transfers data and
control signals between S-GW and P-GW. MME communicates with S-GW over S11
interface. LTE utilizes the Evolved Packet System (EPS) bearers to transfer IP data and
from UE and P-GW that connect S1-U and S5/S8 interfaces containing air interface [33].
Moreover, LTE S1- flex configuration allows one eNodeB to connect to multiple MMEs
by handling S1 interface as a many-to-many interface. X2 interface is presented in LTE
for inter-eNodeB communication.
3.5 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our problem can be defined as follows: “Given an 802.11s-based wireless mesh
network and LTE, our primary goal is to distribute the obfuscation values to the SMs
and collect the obfuscated values from them in a secure and efficient way via TTP. Our
secondary goal is to assess the overhead of this process in a large scale AMI network and
LTE, and thus analyze the feasibility of the approach for future SG applications.” The
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security goals are elaborated next along with the corresponding attacks. Note that these
security goals are in addition to the goals of preventing misuse of finely-grained meter
data and preserving the ability to perform state estimation.
3.6 THREAT MODEL AND SECURITY GOALS
The following attacks to the privacy and security of the collection of fine-grained
meter data are identified in the AMI and established the associated security goals. They
are organized into two sets: those targeting the consumer and those targeting the utility
company. The first set relates to the privacy of a consumer’s fine-grained meter data.
• Attack 1: The utility company misuses fine-grained meter data it obtains to analyze
consumer behavior or shares the data with a third party for this purpose.
• Security Goal 1: Obfuscate the collected fine-grained meter data to protect it from
misuse by the utility company or related third party.
• Attack 2: An eavesdropper monitors the communication channel to capture meter
data in messages between a targeted SM and the gateway to determine the
behavior of its consumer.
• Security Goal 2: Protect communications containing SM readings.
• Attack 3: An eavesdropper compromises a gateway to gather the obfuscation basis
O that is stored to re-generate actual meter readings.
• Security Goal 3: Limit the amount of obfuscation data that could be obtained if a
gateway is compromised.
The second set of attacks relates to accurate state estimation and billing.
• Attack 4: An attacker impersonates the gateway and sends fabricated obfuscation
values to the SMs to change the state of the power grid.
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• Security Goal 4: Provide sender authentication to verify the sender and contents of
messages.
• Attack 5: An attacker captures the obfuscation values and replay them to change
the state or billing.
• Security Goal 5: Identify and discard replayed messages.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA OBFUSCATION ON A WIRELESS MESH NETWORK AND LTE
In this section, the design of a realistic architecture and procedures for obfuscating
and collecting SM data is described in detail. The approach has two phases: First,
obfuscation values are created by the gateway and distributed to the SMs. Second, each
SM creates its obfuscated power reading and transmits it to the gateway. Note that our
approach avoids the assumption that each SM has a communication link with the TTP.
The gateway transmits all the data to the TTP which is responsible to create the data
vector and transmit to the utility control center for state estimation. TTP also performs
billing computations at the end of each billing period and stores all obfuscated customer
data for archival purposes.
4.1 CREATING THE OBFUSCATION VECTOR
The gateway is responsible for creating the obfuscation vector. To do this, the
utility company first sends the basis of the obfuscation space, O, to the gateway directly.
The gateway randomly selects weights (η) for each of the vectors in O and constructs an
obfuscation vector. An example for a simple mesh topology is provided in Fig. 4.1. In
this example, upon receiving O, the gateway randomly chooses weights for each vector vi
in O and constructs the actual obfuscation vector o. Note that the row size of this vector
will be equal to the size of the SMs in the network. If there is single gateway as assumed
in our case, each SM will be assigned one element from this vector o.
Nevertheless, given the large size of the AMI networks, this may not be feasible and
the network may need to be divided into multiple clusters of SMs each led by a different
gateway. For those cases, our approach will still apply with one difference: Each gateway
will get the same O and will create an obfuscation vector for all the SMs. However, each
gateway only serves a subset of all the SMs. Therefore, when distributing the obfuscation
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Figure 4.1. A mesh topology of 7 SMs. First, the gateway receives
the obfuscation basis from the utility and creates the obfuscation
vector by picking random η values and multiplying them with each
vector of the O. Then, each obfuscation element (italic) (i.e., o[j]
where j : 1 to 7) is communicated to its corresponding SM.
values, only the SMs that are within the cluster of that gateway will be contacted.
Nonetheless, this approach may not be efficient in terms of O transmissions and
computations.
Let a sample O be:
{(1, 0, 0,−1, 0, 1, 1)T ,
(0, 1, 0, 0, 2,−1, 0)T ,
(−1, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 1)T}
and the gateway randomly generates the weights η1 = 17, η2 = −15, η3 = 22 at time t1. It
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then constructs the obfuscation vector o as follows:
17× (1, 0, 0,−1, 0, 1, 1)T
+ (−15)× (0, 1, 0, 0, 2,−1, 0)T
+ 22× (−1, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0, 1)T
= (−5,−15, 44,−17,−8, 2, 39)T .
Let vi denote the i
th vector in every O, the gateway stores a sum of (η) values for all
vi during a particular billing period T where i can get values from 1 to the number of
vectors in O. Let T is divided into the following epochs: {t1, t2, ...tn}, and ηtji denotes the
η value for vi at time tj, then the sum of all η values for all vi is: sumi =
∑j=n
j=1 η
tj
i .
When the final meter reading for a billing period is collected, the gateway chooses the
weight (ηtni ) for a particular vector vi so that the sumi becomes zero. Thus, η
tn
i is chosen
as −∑j=n−1j=1 ηtji so that ∑j=nj=1 ηtji = 0. For the example in Fig. 4.1, if we assume that
there are two more collection times, t2 and t3, using the same O, the weights can be as
follows: At t2, let us assume that the weights are again randomly chosen as 10, 12, 3. At
t3, the weights must be chosen as -27, 3, -25 so that the sumi =
∑j=3
j=1 η
tj
i = 0.
4.2 SECURE DISTRIBUTION OF OBFUSCATED VALUES
Once the obfuscation vector o is created at the gateway, the next task is to send
these values to SMs in a secure and efficient way. To reduce the traffic, one possibility is
to broadcast the whole vector within the network and let each SM pick its corresponding
obfuscation value. However, there are issues regarding this method. First of all, TCP is
used which does not support broadcast. Even if UDP is used without acknowledgements,
this creates unnecessary flooding in the network where some SMs receive the same vector
multiple times from their neighbors which will be redundant. In addition, the size of the
whole vector will grow with the increased SM count and thus may necessitate additional
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broadcasts due to exceeding maximum transfer unit (MTU) for IEEE 802.11 standard.
Given that SMs send readings at regular intervals, we opt to use inter-interval times to
distribute the obfuscation values using unicasting capability of IEEE 802.11s standard
through its routing protocol HWMP. The gateway prepares a packet for each SM and
transmits to each SM separately.
Specifically, the gateway encrypts the elements in the vector with the public key
(PUi) of its corresponding SMi. The gateway then sends each SM its corresponding
element of the obfuscation vector (which is represented as o[i]) by signing it with its
private key PRG and adding a timestamp (TS) as follows. This is also illustrated in
Fig. 4.1.
Gateway → SMi : {< o[i], TS >}PUi , SigPRG({< o[i], TS >}PUi)
4.3 CALCULATING AND TRANSMITTING OBFUSCATED
MEASUREMENTS
When an SMi receives its element o[i], it calculates its obfuscated power
measurement (opi) by adding its current power reading (pi) and o[i]: opi = pi + o[i]. SMi
then timestamps (TS) the sum and digitally signs the message for the gateway using its
private key, PRi. SMi then transmits this to the gateway again by using HWMP:
SMi → Gateway :< TS, opi >,SigPRi(< TS, opi >)
Upon receiving the obfuscated measurements from each SM, the gateway verifies the
digital signatures and timestamps. It then sends them to the TTP. For simplicity, we
assume that the gateway can wait for all the SM readings and send them as a single
packet.
TTP prepares the obfuscated measurement vector for the utility. In addition, when
the billing period ends, it can sum all the measurements to obtain the total usage for
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Figure 4.2. Each meter adds its current reading (circled) to the
received obfuscation values to calculate its obfuscated reading (under-
lined). SM4, for example, has a current reading of 7. It sums it with
the obfuscation value it received, -17, obtaining an obfuscated reading
of -10. The obfuscated readings are securely communicated back to
the gateway which constructs the obfuscated measurement vector,
zobf . This is sent to the TTP.
each SM for the billing period to charge the customer. The utility receives the obfuscated
measurement vector from the TTP and uses it for performing state estimation. Based on
the O in Figure 4.1, the calculation and collection of the measurements are depicted in
Figure 4.2.
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4.4 USING LTE/EPC MODEL
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the goal is to use the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) that
is a flat architecture that provides a converged voice and data networking framework to
connect users on a Long-Term Evolution (LTE) network.
In this study, Packet Data Node Gateway (PGW) acts as the interface and provides
connectivity from the Utility as User Equipment(UE) to gateway in the LTE network.
The PGW categorizes each incoming packet from gateway and routes it to a mobility
tunnel that reaches the eNB (base station). The eNB maps and manages the data
transmission to the Utility (as UsEr Equipment) on appropriate radio bearer channels.
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CHAPTER 5
MULTIPLE GATEWAYS FOR INCREASED EFFICIENCY AND
SECURITY
5.1 MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
The scheduled obfuscation value distribution approach with a single gateway poses
some issues regarding security and efficiency. First of all, a single gateway will become a
bottleneck when IEEE 802.11s is used with increased node count. This is because of the
increased hop counts, congestion and interference in the network. Previous studies
suggest using clustering within the AMI network and adjust the size of each cluster based
on network conditions [34]. Therefore, it is preferable to use multiple gateways for
scalability concerns. However, this is not the only issue. Another motivation to use
multiple gateways is due to the security of the distribution of obfuscation values. If a
single gateway is being used, it is possible for the entire obfuscation vector to be
captured when the gateway is compromised. Since this obfuscation vector is a linear
combination of the vectors of O, a linear system of equations could be formed with O
and the obfuscated readings received at the gateway, which can be solved to determine
the η weights used to construct o. Since there are m− n possible vectors of O, one would
need to have the information to form m− n linearly-independent equations to be able to
solve for the weights. These weights could then be used to reconstruct the entire
obfuscation vector o, which could be used to calculate the actual readings from the
obfuscated measurements. This can be protected against as long as a gateway uses less
than m− n vectors. Splitting the process of generating the obfuscation vector among
multiple gateways could be used to reduce this vulnerability.
The solution described in the following is to separate the vectors of O among
multiple gateways. Each gateway would then select the η weights for its given vectors
and create one part of the obfuscation vector o. These could be sent directly to their
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associated SMs, but if each gateway is responsible for the SMs in a portion of the grid,
each gateway would have to send to the other gateways the elements of their partial
obfuscation vector that are associated to the meters for which that gateway is
responsible. Since each gateway only has a portion of the basis from which the full
obfuscation vector is derived, an adversary compromising one gateway would be limited
in the number of actual readings it could acquire.
5.2 MULTI-GATEWAY COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL VIA LTE D2D
Multi-gateway communication protocol is geared for information exchange among
the gateways. It is assumed that the AMI network is divided into multiple clusters,
where each is led by a different gateway. Each gateway node has two radios one for
802.11s and one for LTE. Each gateway knows the IDs of SMs within its cluster and the
public keys of other gateways in advance. The gateways need to communicate with each
other to exchange the obfuscation elements using device to device (D2D) communication
architecture that is recently being standardized for LTE-Advanced under proximity
services (ProSe) studies [35] (also known as LTE-Direct [36]). While direct
communications has been possible in unlicensed bands, e.g., using WiFi-direct, there are
various challenges, such as the high interference in the unlicensed bands, as well as the
difficulty of pairing and synchronizing D2D transmissions. In LTE-Advanced Release-12
standardization, preliminary studies on D2D and ProSe communications were initiated
for commercial and public safety applications [37]. A major benefit of ProSe D2D
communications in LTE-Advanced is that device pairing, resource allocation, and power
control can be coordinated through a base station (which e.g. can be embedded in the
utility control center in Fig. 4). This allows improved spectral efficiency and lower
scheduling delays compared to completely uncoordinated scheduling of D2D
transmissions. Use of licensed bands also allows improved quality of service for D2D
transmissions.
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Each gateway would run the same protocol explained in the previous section within
its cluster once the obfuscation vector is formed. However, the formation of this
obfuscation vector is different in this case. The protocol begins when the utility provider
derives the obfuscation basis O. It splits O into g components where g represents the
number of gateways involved. Then each components is encrypted with each gateway’s
public key and sent to that gateway through LTE network.
When a gateway involved in the obfuscation generation receives its partial O, it
chooses the η weight(s) and calculates its partial obfuscation vector. This vector would
have obfuscation values for all the SMs in the network but the gateway distributes only
the ones that belong to its cluster. The other portions are transmitted to the other
gateways (in encrypted form) so that they can distribute corresponding values within
their own clusters.
In this way, a reading of an SM in a particular cluster will be obfuscated by adding
g obfuscation values as opposed to one in the previous approach. Again, for a particular
billing period T , the η weights for the same vector are chosen in such a way that the sum
of these weights would be zero. Note that the same security operations of signing and
encryption still apply. In Fig. 5.2 you can see an illustration of how two gateways
generate obfuscation values, exchange them and distribute them to SMs.
5.3 ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS
Algorithm 1 gives the pseudo-code for the procedure running at a particular
gateway for the processes of generating the weights, creating obfuscation values and
distributing them among the gateways.
When an SM receives its obfuscation element, it decrypts it and adds it to its
current reading. The obfuscated readings are signed, timestamped and sent back to the
gateway, which collects all of readings in this cluster and sends them to a the TTP via
LTE. This process is illustrated with a simple example in Fig. 5.3. It is the second phase
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of what is given in Fig. 5.2
Figure 5.1. Contents of the Obfuscation Vector
If there are g gateways, the utility provider needs to send g messages for
transmitting out the partial basis. Each gateway involved in the obfuscation vector
generation would need to contact g − 1 gateways to send its own obfuscation vector. The
remaining steps are similar to those of the single gateway approach and at the end there
will be g total messages sent from the gateways to the TTP. Since the inter-gateway
communication will be using LTE-Direct, it is argued that this will not put any burden
on the gateways. Typically, there will be 648 bits allocated for each entry of a vector as
shown in Fig. 5.1. Since LTE-Direct can send up to 3Gbps, this would allow sending up
to 5000 SMs’ readings at the same time under perfect conditions.
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Figure 5.2. Two gateways case with a mesh topology of 8 SMs. First,
the gateways receive their obfuscation basis from the utility provider
and create the obfuscation vector by picking random η values and
multiplying them with each vector of the O. The gateways exchange
some obfuscation elements in their obfuscation vector according to
the SMs they control. Then, each obfuscation element (italic) (i.e.,
o[j] where j : 1 to 8) is transmitted to its corresponding SM by each
gateway.
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Figure 5.3. Data transmission with two gateways: Each SM adds
its current reading (circled) to the received obfuscation values to
calculate its obfuscated reading (underlined). SM7, for example,
has a current reading of 1. It sums it with the obfuscation values it
received, 0 and -5, obtaining an obfuscated reading of -4. The ob-
fuscated readings are securely transmitted back to the gateway from
which the obfuscation values are received. The gateways construct
the obfuscated measurement vector, zobf and send their vectors to the
TTP.
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Algorithm 1 distributeObfVals(obfBasis[][], collTimes)
1: numOfAllSMs = obfBasis[0].length
2: weights[collTimes][collTimes]
3: initObfVect[collTimes]
4: obfVectFrGWs[numOfAllGWs - 1][numOfNSMs]
5: ultimateObfVect[numOfNSMs]
6: i = 0
7: for all i ≤ collT imes - 1 do
8: if (i == collT imes - 1) then
9: weights[i] = generateComplementWeights(weights)
10: else
11: weights[i] = generateRandomWeights(collT imes)
12: end if
13: j = 0
14: for all j ≤ numOfAllSMs - 1 do
15: initObfVect[j] = 0
16: k = 0
17: for all k ≤ collT imes - 1 do
18: initObfVect[j] += (weights[i][k] * obfBasis[k][j])
19: k++
20: end for
21: j++
22: end for
23: deliverObfValsToGWs(initObfVect)
24: obfVectFrGWs = receiveObfValsFromGWs()
25: ultimateObfVect =
26: combineVects(initObfVect, obfVectFrGWs)
27: sendObfValsToSMs(ultimateObfVect)
28: waitForNextCycle(waitT ime)
29: i++
30: end for
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CHAPTER 6
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
6.1 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the scheduled obfuscation approach based on the security goals listed
in Section 3.6 are evaluated.
• Security Goal 1: Since the fine-grained meter data is obfuscated, the actual reading
cannot be determined at any time. Because of this, it cannot be analyzed to
determine any activity or behavior of the consumer.
• Security Goal 2: The obfuscated reading that the SM sends to the gateway does
not reflect the actual reading. Therefore, even if an eavesdropper captures this
reading, its inference about the activity in the house will be wrong. Also, since the
gateways disseminate different obfuscation values at each reading collection period,
the eavesdropper cannot extract a pattern of the consumer’s power consumption.
• Security Goal 3: If a gateway is compromised, the obfuscation information
regarding that cluster could be obtained. However, since there are other
obfuscation values coming from the other gateways, the attacker needs to have
access to all other gateways as well. Therefore, obtaining actual meter readings is
not possible with a single gateway being compromised.
• Security Goal 4: Since all the SMs use digital signatures for messages containing
obfuscation information and measurements, the digital signature can be verified to
confirm the identity of the message sender. In addition, since the messages are
digitally signed, they cannot be modified without invalidating the signature,
providing message integrity.
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• Security Goal 5: Since all messages are timestamped and digitally signed, the
timestamp can be checked to verify that the received message is for the current
reading.
6.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The scheduled obfuscation approach is implemented under the widely used network
simulator ns-3 [10], which has an implementation of IEEE 802.11s and LTE. Randomly
connected AMI network topologies were created containing 25, 36, 49, 64 and 81 nodes in
an area of size 1200m x 1200m. The area mimics the size of a neighborhood which uses a
single gateway to communicate with the utility company.
The transmission range of each SM is set to 100m [34]. The underlying MAC
protocol is IEEE 802.11g. TCP protocol is used to ensure reliability compared to UDP.
The data frequency of the SMs is set to 10sec. [34].The simulation is run for 300 secs.
Each run for 10 different topologies are tested and reported the average of these
topologies for significance of the results.
For encryption, crypto++ library [38] is used. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) is an approved signature algorithm for the US government use [39]
and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is a well-known scheme
having several standards [40]. ECDSA is used when only signature is required and
ECIES is used when encryption and signature are required. In both cases, the ASN.1
secp128r1 standard curve with SHA1, having a key length of 256 bits is used.
6.3 BASELINES AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
Three baselines are considered for comparison with the scheduled obfuscation
approach. The first baseline (represented as “baseline” in the graphs) sends meter
readings in clear, providing no privacy. The second baseline (represented as “baseline
sign”) provides authentication but does not provide any confidentiality in transmission
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and the utility provider has access to the fine-grained meter data. The third baseline
(represented as “baseline sec” in the graphs) provides authentication as well as
confidentiality, but the utility provider still has access to the fine-grained meter data.
For the scheduled obfuscation, the scheduled transmission in which a SM sends its
obfuscated reading value to the gateway at every 10sec. even if the meter receives the
obfuscation value earlier. The gateway sends obfuscation values to the SMs for the next
reporting time, simultaneously. This is the default mechanism used in all experiments.
In analyzing the results, three metrics: throughput (i.e., the amount of data received
at the transport layer by the gateway per second), data delay (i.e., the total time it takes
for a reading to reach the gateway) and packet delivery ratio (PDR) (i.e., the ratio of
packets that are delivered to the gateway compared to the number of packets sent by the
SMs) are considered.
6.4 SIMULATION RESULTS
The results of the experiments conducted for comparing the performance of the
scheduled obfuscation approach with those of the other three baseline approaches in
between Smart Meters-Gateway and Gateway-Utility are shown in Figure 6.1, 6.2, 6.3,
6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. Each of the metrics is discussed separately below.
6.4.1 Smart Meters and Gateway
6.4.1.1 PDR
The PDR as shown in Figure 6.1 decreases slightly for all approaches as the number
of SMs increases. This is due to increasing number of packets transmitted throughout the
network from SMs, which increases the collisions. It is seen that PDR is the highest for
the baseline because it has the smallest packet size compared to the other three
approaches. The baseline sign and baseline sec approaches achieve a little different PDR,
but mostly the baseline sign is slightly better because its packet size is smaller than that
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Figure 6.1. PDR at different number of nodes.
of the baseline sec. The baseline sign and the scheduled obfuscation approach generate
44-byte packets whereas the baseline and the baseline sec generate 12-byte and 65-byte
packets, respectively.
Although the scheduled obfuscation approach and baseline sign generate the same
size packets, the former mostly achieves lower PDR. This is due to the two-way packet
traffic between the SMs and the gateway. Contrary to the other baselines, the the
scheduled obfuscation approach needs to have obfuscation values coming from the
gateway. The scheduled obfuscation is scheduled and waits for the end of 10secs to send
all the SM readings. At the same time, the gateway starts sending obfuscation values for
the next cycle. The obfuscation values coming from the gateway are signed and
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encrypted and thus the packet size becomes 65 bytes which is even greater than the
readings’ size (i.e., 44 bytes after signing). Therefore, the obfuscation values sent for the
next data cycle may collide with some of the SM readings. This slightly increases the
number of dropped packets and results in a decrease in the PDR.
6.4.1.2 Throughput
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Figure 6.2. Throughput at different number of nodes.
As seen in Fig. 6.2, the throughput increases as the network size grows due to the
contribution of more nodes as expected. Although the throughputs of the baseline sign
and the scheduled obfuscation approach are similar as expected because of the almost
near sending packet size, there seems to be a little difference between scheduled
obfuscation approach and baseline sign. This is again due to the crossing of traffic when
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the obfuscation values are being sent from the gateways to the SMs and shortly after the
readings are being sent from SMs to the gateway through the same paths. While these
transmissions are happening one after another, there may still be some traffic in the
network during the transmission of obfuscation values to the leaves (i.e., the nodes at the
far end of the network) of the network topology. This can cause some interference and
keep the channel busy at certain parts of the network which eventually causes the rate of
increase in throughput to reduce slightly. However, overall these results indicate that
there is no major adverse effect of the proposed distribution and obfuscation approach in
terms of throughput.
It is also seen in Fig. 6.2 that the baseline sign, the baseline sec and the scheduled
obfuscation approach have significantly higher throughput than the baseline has. This
can be attributed to the sizes of the packets they send. Even if the baseline has the
highest PDR, the sizes of the packets the other three approaches generate compensate
this difference and cause higher throughput.
6.4.1.3 Delay
The impact of the approach on ETE delay is an important metric for some of the
AMI applications such as demand and response. The delay of all of the baselines is
almost close when the network size is smaller (i.e., up to 36 nodes), and it increases
because of the increase in congestion cases as the network size grows. The scheduled
obfuscation approach is expected to experience almost the same delay with the baseline
sign for all of the number of nodes, but it demonstrates difference delays after 25 nodes.
There are 2 reasons. First reason is that the baseline, the baseline sign and the
baseline sec can send their readings around the same time which more nodes become
involved in message sending at the same time and thus channel access delay increases
significantly due to heavy contention and interference. As for scheduled obfuscation, they
cannot send their readings around the same time since the SMs are waiting for
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obfuscation values from the gateway. The obfuscation values reach the destinations at
different times due to the topological structure of the network and SMs are scheduled to
send their readings at the next sending time. Since ns-3 does not schedule the sending
operation to an exact time value but schedules it so as to be performed after a given time
interval, the SMs cannot be scheduled to exactly the same time for transmission. They
are scheduled between the same seconds, but there are time lags (some milliseconds)
between each scheduling. This apparently reduces the contention among the nodes for
accessing the channel in the network and thus MAC layer delay is reduced.
The other reason is that computation time for encryption and signature process can
be high when the baseline sign signs their readings and the baseline sec encrypts their
readings. Therefore, delay time for the baseline sign and the baseline sec is higher than
other approaches in Figure. 6.3
6.4.2 Gateway and Utility
6.4.2.1 PDR
The PDR as seen in Figure 6.4 decreases slightly for the baseline sign, the baseline
sec and the scheduled obfuscation because the number of SMs increases. Increasing
number of packets transmitted throughout the network from SMs augments the
collisions. It is seen that PDR is constant for the baseline because it has the smallest
packet size compared to the other three approaches and all collected reading values
coming from gateway sends to utility one time with small packet size. After node 49,
PDR increases slightly for the baseline sign, the baseline sec and the scheduled
obfuscation because of packet segmentation. These three approaches’ packet size are high
because of signature, encryption and obfuscation process. If the data packet is larger
than the maximum transmission unit supported by the network, packet segmentation
divides a data packet into smaller units for transmission over the network. Therefore, the
number of dropped packets decreases and result in a increase in the PDR.
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Figure 6.3. Delay at different number of nodes.
6.4.2.2 Throughput
As illustrated in Figure. 6.5, the throughput increases because the network size
grows due to the contribution. The throughputs of the baseline sign and the scheduled
obfuscation are same for all of the number of the number of nodes since the main reason
is the packet size of all collected the obfuscated or signed values are being sent from
gateway to utility are same for both of these approaches. In addition, these obfuscated or
signed values are sent just one time so there is less crossing of traffic and less contention
among the nodes for accessing the channel in the network. It is also seen that the
baseline sign, baseline sec and scheduled obfuscation have higher than throughput than
baseline has because of the size of the packets they send.
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Figure 6.4. PDR at different number of nodes.
6.4.2.3 Delay
As illustrated in Figure 6.6, the delay of all approaches increases due to the increase
in congestion cases as the network size grows. The scheduled obfuscation approach
experiences the same delay with the baseline sign for all of the number of nodes since the
baseline sign and the scheduled obfuscation generate 44-byte packets. In addition, there is
not heavy crossing of traffic or contention among the nodes for accessing the channel in
this network topology since all collected reading values that are signed or obfuscated, are
sent just one time from the gateway to utility. It is shown in Figure 6.6 that baseline sec
has significantly higher delay than the baseline due to the size of the packets they send.
The baseline sec has the highest delay since baseline sec generate 65-byte packets. The
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Figure 6.5. Throughput at different number of nodes.
baseline generate 12-byte packets. Therefore, the delay of baseline is the lowest.
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41
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, the problem of user privacy preservation is tackled in SG that will
also enable distribution state estimation. A data obfuscation mechanism is followed and
proposed secure and efficient algorithms to distribute obfuscation values within an AMI
and LTE network. Specifically, ECC is used for hiding and authenticating the
obfuscation values that are distributed within the network. Using LTE EPC model
between gateway and utility is to enable operators to deploy and operate one common
packet core network for 3GPP radio access (LTE, 3G, and 2G) and non-3GPP radio
access (HRPD, WLAN, and WiMAX). Multiple-gateway implementations are also
considered for increased security. A protocol that utilizes LTE-Direct for exchanging of
data among multiple gateways is proposed.
All the proposed approaches are implemented in ns-3 using LTE and a draft version
of 802.11s for a 802.11s-based mesh network to assess their overhead. Simulation results
showed that the obfuscation approaches are promising in terms of ETE delay without
introducing additional overhead on PDR and throuhput compared to other existing
approaches. The approaches are analyzed in terms of the security goals they provide and
showed that they can ensure consumer privacy while still allowing state estimation and
billing.
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